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Dissents in Louisiana: Civility Among Civilians?
C. A. Marvin*
From this nation's creation, legal scholars have discussed pro and con the
value or worth of dissenting opinions. Critics of dissenting opinions,
emphasizing that "the law ... is made by those who command the majority,"
consider dissents to have "no consequences within the [legal] system"' and to
be "an exercise in futility,"' only "as valuable as is the audit of an honest
banker's books."3 In this perspective, the dissenter is simply considered a sore
loser, who comes across "like the small boy making faces at the big boy across
the street, whom he cannot whip."4
Those on the other side of the argument naturally include Supreme Court
justices, past and present, who, while recognizing that the dissenter's view rarely
prevails as later law, nonetheless regard a dissenting opinion as a valuable tool
in the decision-making process, especially in the courts of last resort.' Justice
Douglas once said that the right to dissent was the only thing that made life
tolerable for him.6 Others have said, more pedantically, that the articulation of
the dissenting view "safeguards the integrity of the judicial decision-making
process by keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences
of its decision"7 and "improves the final product [the majority opinion] by
forcing the prevailing side to deal with the hardest questions urged by the losing
side."'
Scholarly opinions about the effect of a divided panel or court are also
polarized. At one end, the lack of unanimity is traditionally seen as a negative
reflection on the court or the panel,' while at the other end, the division is
viewed as being positive evidence that the court's decisions "are the product of
independent and thoughtful minds, who try to persuade one another but do not
simply 'go along' for some supposed 'good of the institution.""'  One judge
suggested to me that his oath of office supports what he perceives to be his
obligation to reason independently of his colleagues. He offered his rationale:
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1. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 Hastings L.J 427, 429 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 27 n.19 (1960).
4. Robert A. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Opinions 212 (1974) (quoting V. H. Roberts, Dissenting
Opinions, 39 Am. L. Rev. 23, 24 (1905)).
5. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 33, 36-37, 41-42; Brennan,
supra note 1, at 434-36.
6. Scalia, supra note 5, at 42.
7. Brennan, supra note I, at 430.
8. Id.
9. Scalia, supra note 5, at 35.
10. Id.
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"I have taken an oath to uphold the constitutions of the state and nation and
impartially perform my duties to the best of my ability and understanding, and
that's all I have. My understanding and my ability are just not the same as
yours!""
The negative view of dissents prevailed among traditional common law
scholars well into the earlier part of this century. 2 Because of their tradition,
they regarded a dissenting opinion which did not convey "full respect for the
doctrine of stare decisis" as "an iconoclastic endeavor to upset all that has gone
before[,] ... [a mere vehicle] for the conveyance of pet ideologies ... [or an
attempt] to substitute the impulses of the present for the wisdom of the
past .... .""
Justice Brennan, however, in his 1986 lecture defending both the use and the
scholarly worth of dissenting opinions, regarded a well-reasoned dissent as a
benefit, rather than a threat, to the integrity of the judicial system:
This is not to say that stare decisis is of little consequence .... As
Chief Justice Taney observed, the authority of the [Supreme] Court's
construction of the Constitution ultimately "depend[s] altogether on the
force of the reasoning by which it is supported." A dissent challenges
the reasoning of the majority, tests its authority and establishes a
benchmark against which the majority's reasoning can continue to be
evaluated, and perhaps, in time, superseded. . . [S]imply by infusing
different ideas and methods of analysis into judicial decision-making,
dissents prevent that process from becoming rigid or stale. And, each
time the Court revisits an issue, the justices are forced by a dissent to
reconsider the fundamental questions and to rethink the result."
I. THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN LOUISIANA
Our late civilian scholar, then Louisiana Justice Albert Tate, Jr., in a 1974
article, when comparing his role with that of his common law colleagues,
concluded that civilian judges in a "mixed jurisdiction" reasoned similarly to
common law judges:
II. See generally La. Const. art. X, § 30.
12. See generally Leflar, supra note 4, at 203-12.
13. Leflar, supra note 4, at 205 (quoting R. Dean Moorhead, Concurring and Dissenting
Opinions, 38 A.B.A. J. 821, 884 (1952)).
14. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435-36. The author quotes approvingly from Charles Evans
Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States (1928): "[W]hat must ultimately sustain the court
in public confidence is the character and independence of the judges. They are not there simply to
decide cases but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable
that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and
recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice." Brennan, supra note 1, at
434.
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Our basically civilian tradition has been partly overlaid and replaced by
Anglo-American common law....
Today, despite the renewed importance of the civilian sources of our
substantive law, there is little support in the Louisiana bench and bar for
the civilian theory that the role of the judges is to decide cases only,
leaving doctrinal development to the scholarly writers....
The Louisiana judge, like his common-law brother, is a law-announcer
as well as a case-decider....
As with the common-law judge, he views himself not merely as a
technician but also as a scholar, law-maker and exponent of doctrine.
However, as with a modem day civilian judge, he is essentially more
free than his common law counterpart from the mechanical effects of
"binding" precedent; he has the freedom to return, independent of
intervening judicial precedents, to the initial legislative concepts and use
creative analogies and constructs based upon them; or, in the absence
of legislation expressly intended to apply, he is free to devise socially
just and sound rules to regulate the unprovided-for case."3
Justice Tate noted that even in other states, a judge is less bound by
precedent when deciding an issue of constitutional, rather than jurisprudential or
statutory, law.' 6 This difference in "judicial latitude," if you will, may perhaps
explain why dissenting opinions are generally valued more by those who
routinely decide constitutional issues than by those who equate the role or
function of the common-law judge with the rather mechanical application of
"settled law," as determined by majority vote in either or both the courts and the
legislature, to a particular set of facts.
Justice Tate explained that a Louisiana judge "applies to the Civil Code and
other legislation the type of reasoning that a common law judge applies to a
constitutional provision."'7 The role of the judge in our "mixed"jurisdiction thus
appears to favor, or at least to tolerate, the use of dissenting opinions to express
a particular judge's independent understanding of the meaning of the Civil Code
and other legislation when that understanding differs from the majority view.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL CIVILITY
A dissenting vote cast without written reasons, or a dissenting opinion which
expresses only trivial and insubstantial grounds for the author's disagreement with
the majority opinion, has no value and may harm the collegiality of the -bench.'8
15. Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions, 20 Loy. L. Rev. 231, 231, 236-
37, 243 (1974).
16. Id. at 240.
17. Id.
18. Brennan, supra note 1, at 435.
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A dissenting opinion may also cause harm when it denounces or insults the
majority's opinion or its members. The dissenting opinion "should express [the
author's] reason, not his feelings.""
The temptation to express negative feelings or disparaging comments about
the majority opinion is sometimes difficult for the dissenting judge to resist,
however. Justice Blackmun once remarked that it is "much easier to write a biting
dissent than a constructive majority opinion., 20  Justice Cardozo said the
dissenter enjoys "a freedom of expression, tinged at rare moments with a touch of
bitterness, which magnanimity as well as caution would reject for one trium-
phant." 2'
Even those who regard dissenting opinions as vital to the institutional well-
being of appellate courts agree that judges "must be able to express strong
disagreement with one another [without doing] so disagreeably. ' 22  The
importance of judicial civility has long been recognized. Charles Evans Hughes,
who served on both the federal appellate bench and on the United States Supreme
Court, wrote in 1928: "Independencedoes not mean cantankerousnessand ajudge
may be a strong judge without being an impossible person. Nothing is more
distressing on any bench than the exhibition of a captious, impatient, querulous
spirit." 23 The dissenting judge is expected to disagree without being disagree-
able, much like the opposing lawyers in the case are expected to do when
representing their respective clients.
In Louisiana, the rules of the supreme court and the five appellate circuits
impose professional standards on lawyers. The supreme court requires that the
language used in any brief filed in the court be "courteous, and free from insulting
criticism of any person, individually or officially, or of any class or association of
persons, or of any court of justice, or other institution." '24 The Uniform Rules of
the Courts of Appeal contain a similar requirement that language used in briefs
"shall be courteous, free from vile, obscene, obnoxious, or offensive expressions,
and free from insulting, abusive, discourteous, or irrelevant matter or criticism of
any person, class of persons or association of persons, or any court, or judge or
other officer thereof, or of any institution. " 2
The "gentleman lawyer" standard of professionalism which many thought to
have existed in years past is now considered subsumed or eclipsed by the more
aggressive and rancorous style of advocacy that prevails today.26 The Louisiana
19. Leflar, supra note 4, at 206 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated
Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. J. 794 (1953)).
20. Leflar, supra note 4, at 203.
21. Scalia, supra note 5, at 42.
22. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of Judicial
Civility, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 583, 623 (1994).
23. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 68 (1928).
24. La. S. Ct. Rules, Rule VII, § 7 (1997).
25. Unif. Rules of La. Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4 (1997).
26. See generally Gaffney, supra note 22, and particularly the text and accompanying footnotes
at 584-85 and 623-24.
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Supreme Court recently amended the Rules for Continuing Legal Education to
include the topic of "professionalism"as a mandatory continuing education subject
each year, in addition to the existing "ethics" requirement. The amended rule
explains that legal ethics "concerns the standard of professional conduct and
responsibility required of a lawyer," while professionalism "entails what is more
broadly expected of attorneys ... in the service of [the] client and [the] public
good[.]""
The aggressive and rancorous style that characterizes the legal profession has
also affected the bench. Within the past decade, beginning in 1989, a committee
of federal court judges and lawyers in the Seventh Federal Circuit surveyed
members of the bench and bar in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin to investigate
concerns over the "growing incivility in the practice of law, both on and off the
bench."" In 1992, the Seventh Circuit adopted the committee's recommended
Standards for Professional Conduct within the circuit. While not ethical "rules"
per se, the standards clarify duties which "bind lawyers to better conduct with
respect to their fellow lawyers and to the courts in which they practice, and they
bind judges to better conduct towards lawyers and other judges. 2 9 Of particular
interest here are these three obligations which judges in the Seventh Circuit have
undertaken with respect to one another:
We will be courteous, respectful, and civil in opinions, ever mindful that
a position articulatedby anotherjudge is the result of that judge's earnest
effort to interpret the law and the facts correctly.
In all written and oral communications, we will abstain from disparaging
personal remarks or criticisms, or sarcastic or demeaning comments
about another judge.
We will endeavor to work with otherjudges in an effort to foster a spirit
of cooperation in our mutual goal of enhancing the administration of
justice.3
The American Inns of Court, created in 1980, also recommends that professional
standards for lawyers and judges be adopted by its member inns.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also recently adopted, as a General Admini-
strative Rule, the Code of Professionalism in the Courts. This rule states
aspirational standards of civility and professionalism as duties owed by judges and
lawyers to one another, to litigants, and to the court system. 31 Specifically
27. Amendments to Rules of the Supreme Court-Rule XXX, adopted May 23, 1997, effective
January 1, 1998, reported in West's Louisiana Cases, 693-694 So. 2d at LXII-LXIV (emphasis
supplied).
28. Gaffney, supra note 22, at 584.
29. Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 589 (quoting Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial
Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441 (1992)) (emphasis added).
31. Amendment to Rules of the Supreme Court, Part 0, New Section 11, adopted August 5, 1997,
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included are the three duties of judges toward their colleagues contained in the
Seventh Federal Circuit's Standards for Professional Conduct quoted above.32
In the resolution and preamble to the Louisiana Code of Professionalism, the
supreme court encourages voluntary use of the new standards by lawyers while
stating that the standards "should be... followed by all judges of the State of
Louisiana.""
III. LOUISIANA DISSENTS
My curiosity in recent years about the overall degree of civility and
professionalism in Louisiana's appellate judiciary led me to search for reported
Louisiana civil cases from 1982 through late 1997 with written dissents which cite
or discuss the Civil Code.34 A review of these 375 cases allows the conclusion
that Louisiana justices and judges have generally maintained a high degree of
professionalism, even without formal standards of judicial civility such as those
adopted by the Seventh Federal Circuit in 1992 and by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in 1997.
in about ninety percent of the cases reviewed, the dissenter simply expressed
his or her disagreement with the majority on either, or both, the facts and the law
without being disagreeable or expressing any negative "feelings" about the
dissenter's colleagues. The dissenter wrote the classical and acceptable dissent in
such cases."
A much smaller percent of the Louisiana dissents may be said to be
disagreeable and unacceptable to some degree, some only mildly or obliquely so,
others more pointedly. A few Louisiana dissents may be said to express not only
extreme or scathing criticism of the majority's decision and reasoning, but also
acerbic remarks that are discourteous, disparaging, offensive, or personally
insulting to the motive and intellect of the majority judges.
IV. MILDLY TO MODERATELY CRITICAL DISSENTS
The milder dissents remain, for the most part, appropriately focused on the
legal or factual differences with the majority, taking only an occasional "dig" at
the other side. See, for example, these remarks:
reported in West's Louisiana Cases, 697-698 So.2d at XXXIX-XLI.
32. Id. at XLI. See supra text accompanying note 30.
33. Id. at XXXIX, XL.
34. The search was conducted on WESTLAW using the query: dis("Civil Code" "Civ. Code"
C.C.) & da(after 1/t/1982).
35. One appropriate technique when the majority is affirming a lower court is for the dissenter
to criticize not the majority opinion, but the opinion of the lower court. See, e.g., State in Int. of
R.W. v. J.L.W., 491 So. 2d 652, 656-65 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (on original hearing) (Marvin, J.,
dissenting), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 649 (1986).
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Hard facts make bad law.36
The facts are acceptably well stated in the majority opinion.3
[T]he recitation of facts in the majority opinion leaves much to be de-
sired ......
The majority has made two errors. It has substituted its own fact
finding for that of the trial court, and it has ignored the law. 9
[T]he majority treats us to wishful conclusions, grandly cast but sparsely
supported.'0
Some dissenters describe the majority decision as "unjust"..." "an injustice,"' 2
or "unconscionable.""3 A few go beyond merely suggesting why or how the
majority should have reached a different result by including in the dissent a
lengthy proposed "alternative" to the majority opinion."
Other dissents that contain language critical of the majority opinion are more
pointed than the mild dissents described above, but not as acerbic as those
mentioned below. For example, the majority decision in Succession of Lauga,'
finding unconstitutional the legislation which excluded competent persons over
the age of twenty-three from being considered forced heirs, prompted these
remarks from two of the three dissenting justices:
The majority opinion desperately clings to an ancient tradition that had
its roots in entirely different times and circumstances.
46
36. Jackson v. Continental Cas. Co., 412 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (La. 1982) (Blanche, J., dissenting).
37. Taylor v. U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 237, 243 (La. 1993) (Ortique, J.,
dissenting in part).
38. St. Hill v. Tabor, 532 So. 2d 776, 781 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (Bowes, J., dissenting),
reversed, 542 So. 2d 499 (1989).
39. Roberson v. Huggins, 498 So. 2d 32, 37 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (Edwards, J., dissenting),
writ denied, 501 So. 2d 216 (1987).
40. Kozlowski v. Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 534 So. 2d 1260, 1271 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1988) (Grisbaum, J., dissenting), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 592 (1989).
41. Sharp v. Daigre, 545 So. 2d 1063, 1085 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (Lanier, LeBlanc, and
Savoie, JJ., dissenting), affirmed, 555 So. 2d 1361 (1990).
42. Picone v, Lyons, 601 So. 2d 1375, 1378 (La.. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting); In re Levy, 427
So. 2d 844, 848 (La. 1983) (Watson, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. Clark, 431 So. 2d 817, 823 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1983) (Jasper Jones, J., dissenting), affirmed as amended, 448 So. 2d 681 (1984).
43. Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So. 2d 351, 356 (La. 1992) (Watson, J., dissenting);
Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Derbes, 436 So. 2d 1185, 1197 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (Barry, J. dissenting), writ
denied, 441 So. 2d 1220 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938, 104 S. Ct. 1912 (1984).
44. Tesvich v. 3-A's Towing Co., 547 So. 2d 1106, 1114-36 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (Williams, J.,
dissenting in part), writ denied, 552 So. 2d 383, 384 (1989); State through Dept. of Highways v.
Luling Indus. Park, Inc., 443 So. 2d 672, 682-90 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (Samuel, J., dissenting),
writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1247 (1984), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S. Ct. 3593 (1984).
45. 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
46. Id. at 1184 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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I disagree with the majority's conclusion and with the analytical
machinations engaged in to reach that conclusion ....
Another succession case involving the issue of dual paternity provoked a
dissenter to remark:
[B]efore adopting a loose cannon approach to this area of law, this court
ought to at least explain why it is not restrained by the legislative
will . . ..
More pointedly, the Louisiana dissenters occasionally describe the majority's
interpretation of a statute as "eccentric '49 or "pedantic,"5 and characterize the
majority's resolution of the case as "incongruous,"' "bizarre,"2 or even
"capricious." 53
In an action by a divorcee against her ex-spouse and his new wife for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with a
contract, Judge Thibodeaux dissented in part in 1994. His view, perhaps
unknowingly, employed similar criticism that was more poetically used in 1916
by a Colorado dissenting jurist. Judge Thibodeaux's criticism is emphasized:
I dissent, however, [to the majority's] refusal to recognize a cause of
action for tortious interference with a contract outside the scope of
corporate activity.
Louisiana has unfortunately maintained an anachronistic stranglehold
against recognition of this [cause of action] ...
[The] fluidity [of La. Civ. Code art. 2315] relieves our courts from the
tethered and myopic constraints of nineteenth century thinking which
undermine the formulation of a cause of action based on tortiously
inducing a contractual breach. 4
The more poetic Colorado dissenter crafted his disagreement in the style of
Aesop to create one of my favorite dissents in a fable critical of blind adherence
to precedent:
47. Id. at 1184-85 (Kimball, J., dissenting).
48. Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 480 So. 2d 313. 316 (La. 1986) (dissenting opinion of
Dennis, J.). The majority opinion is reported at 479 So. 2d 324 (La. 1985).
49. Loop, Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 523 So. 2d 201, 208 (La. 1988) (on rehearing) (Dennis,
J., dissenting).
50. Holcomb v. Bossier City Police Dept., 660 So. 2d 199, 204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995) (Brown,
J., dissenting in part).
51. Id.
52. Loop, 523 So. 2d at 209.
53. Plumbing Supply House, Inc. v. Century Nat. Bank, 440 So. 2d 173, 179 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1983) (Garrison, J., dissenting), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1226 (1984).
54. White v. White, 641 So. 2d 538, 543-44 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (Thibodeaux, J., dissenting in
part), writ denied, 648 So. 2d 402 (1994) (emphasis added).
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One day through the primeval wood
A calf walked home, as good calves should;
But left a trail all bent askew,
A crooked trail, as all calves do.
Since then, three hundred years have fled,
And, I infer, the calf is dead.
But still he left behind this trail,
And thereby hangs my moral tale.
For men are prone to go it blind
Along the calf-paths of the mind,
And toil away from sun to sun
To do what other men have done.
They follow in the beaten track,
And out and in, and forth and back,
And still their devious course pursue
To keep the path that others do."
I wish I had said that!
Dissenters sometimes, either consciously or unconsciously, subtly or not so
subtly, analogize the facts of the case or the majority's treatment of the issues
to historical or literary figures. For'instance, one dissenting judge said, "The
plaintiff's petition for damages [against the foreclosing creditor] ... describes
a raid on plaintiff's business of which Attila the Hun justly could be proud."'
Another dissenter stated:
The crux of the issue, and the one on which this case turns, in my
opinion, is the failure of the plaintiff, the trial court, and now this
appellate court, to give specific and exact substance to the duties they
contend were owed by [defendant], personally or otherwise, to this
particular contractor .... Rather, like Banquo's ghost in Shakes-
peare's hallowed "Macbeth," the accusation floats in thin air without
material form or final destination."
In the case of the Interdiction of F. TE.,3' the court addressed the reason.
ableness of the trial court's award of $58,000 in attorney fees and travel expenses
to the interdict's brother, who had attempted to involuntarily commit and fully
interdict F.T.E, but who succeeded only in obtaining a limited interdiction over
55. Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 156 P. 1108, 1121 (1916) (Scott, J., dissenting), quoted in Adalberto
Jordan, Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial Opinion, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 693, 726 (1987).
56. Id. at 178.
57. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 520 So. 2d 1276, 1287 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (Bowes,
J., dissenting), reversed, 538 So. 2d 228 (1989).
58. 622 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
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F.T.E.'s person. The majority of a three-judge appellate panel initially reduced
the award to $36,000, with Judge Brown dissenting on the grounds that even the
reduced award was "extravagant." 9 On rehearing before five judges, the award
was further reduced to $12,500, with Judge Brown writing for the majority. In
his dissent to the decision of the three-judge panel, Judge Brown wrote:
[T]he brother's effort to take over F.T.E.'s estate failed....
From April 1990 until May 1992, F.T.E. wrongly suffered a "civil
death." The expenses of his involuntary confinement were paid by
F.T.E., including his brother's travel expenses from Texas to Shreve-
port. It is not right for F.T.E. to now pay his unsuccessful brother's
legal fees.
I am reminded of Hemmingway's [sic] The Old Man and the Sea,
where Santiago lost his catch to sharks who tore off large chunks.of
meat, "like a pig to a trough."" °
V. HIGHLY CRITICAL DISSENTS
Some dissents impugn not only the reasoning and conclusions of the judges
in the majority, but also their motives, their intellect and competence, and their
integrity. These dissents often attempt, implicitly or expressly, to justify the
dissenter's "feelings" of disbelief and righteous indignation evoked by the
majority result.
In a case allowing an automobile insurer to recover from a claimant $3,400
mistakenly paid to "settle" or "compromise" claims that were. not covered under
the insurer's policy, the dissenting judge described the majority opinion as
"absolutely legally, ethically and morally wrong[,] ... [a] horrendous injustice
... [supported] by no stretch of logic, the law, or the imagination .... ,
A justice who disagreed with the majority's conclusion that rural electric
cooperatives are subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission
wrote:
The linchpin of the majority opinion is, unfortunately, a logical para-
dox .... The rest of the majority opinion constitutes an attempt to
justify this initial fallacy....
The majority's holding ... represents a frightening and unprecedented
aberration in constitutional interpretation .
59. Id. at 674 (Brown, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 673-74.
61. Carter v. Jefferson, 597 So. 2d 128, 133-34 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (Bowes, J., dissenting), writ
denied, 600 So. 2d 609 (1992) (emphasis added).
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In seizing upon the ... statute granting the commission regulatory
power over cooperatives to justify its result in this case, the majority
ignores prior decisions of this Court.... The majority does not rebut
or even confront this formidable obstacle; it simply ignores it....
In light of the logical fallacies generated by the majority in its attempt
to justify its result by constituional analysis, it is small wonder that it
descends into the murky realms of public policy and regulatory econom-
ics in an attempt to justify its conclusion .... The majority ...
decides, on a theoretical level, that pervasive government regulation of
electric cooperatives is necessary to attain some abstract "good." 2
When the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
$500,000 cap on general damages in a medical malpractice action against
multiple defendants, the dissenting justice characterized the majority's analysis,
in maritime metaphors, as "specious," "flawed," "confused," and "disappoint-
ing: 6
3
Like a ship in the night, with only a look and a nod in passing, the
majority barely acknowledges Article I, Section 3 of our state constitu-
tion and this court's [prior] interpretation ... while pursuing a hitherto-
fore uncharted course. Indeed, if my colleagues meant to follow our
previous interpretation of state constitutional law, as their citations
indicate, they certainly fouled up their navigation....
My colleagues... may have acted irresolutely because of a lack of full
understanding of the significant differences between the various equal
protection [levels] ... of scrutiny....
[A] majority of this court has been blinded by a dazzling array of legal
talent assembled by special interest groups opposing the single cata-
strophically injured and disabled tort victim .... (T]he interest groups
may have caused the court to do far-reaching harm to our state constitu-
tional law as well as to many areas of our tort law in addition to
medical malpractice."
Similar accusations that the majority misconstrued the law to favor one side
of the case have been made by dissenting appellate court judges. For example,
in an action by Plaquemines Parish oyster fishermen against the out-of-state
insurers of two tugboats that damaged their oyster beds, the dissenting judge
62. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. La. Public Serv. Comm'n, 544 So. 2d 362, 373-76 (La.
1989) (on rehearing) (Cole, J., dissenting'in part).
63. Butler v. Flint Goodrich Hosp. of Dillard Univ., 607 So. 2d 517, 523, 529 (La. 1992)
(Dennis, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 909, 113 S. Ct. 2338 (1993).
1 64. Id. at 525-26, 528, 531-32.
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accused the majority of "twisting and warping" the applicable case law "to
augment the local plaintiffs' recovery...
To the majority's opinion upholding the authenticity of an olographic will
against the decedent's intestate heirs, some of whom admitted they had cut the
decedent's signature off the will after his death, the dissenter's acrimonious
accusations of his colleagues unduly taint his stated reasons for dissenting:
Have we come to the point where the writing of laws is completely in
vain?
Shrouding itself under the banner of circumstantial evidence, the
majority simply ignores the express requirement of LSA-C.C.P. Art.
2883 that an olographic will "must be proved by the testimony of two
credible witnesses that the testament was ... signed in the testator's
handwriting ...." Such wording is plain as day and can be understood
by the average high-schooler!
Insofar as our record, seven individuals (at most) saw the subject
document intact .... The first four are deceased, and apparently
unnoticed by the majority, cannot present their "testimony" as "witness-
es."
[The next paragraph notes that a fifth person did not testify and that the
testimony of the remaining two witnesses conflicted.]
In short, we are left with only one witness identifying the signature.
Furthermore, even that individual's familiarity with [the decedent's]
handwriting and signature is questionable. This, quite obviously, does
not conform to the requirements of Article 2883.
It never ceases to amaze, in the vernacular, "when push comes to
shove," how otherwise assumed logicians can be convinced, and will
indeed announce, that Night is Day, Empty is Full, and, in the present
case, One is Two. Such legerdemains at the hands of the law somehow
always trouble those outside our professional ranks. If we are simply
intent upon producing a certain outcome irrespective of existing statutes,
can that fact not at least be forthrightly so stated?
The whole framework of the law, its certainty and reliability, suffer
when judicially fashioned results disregard the written word, and spring
merely from a desire of judges to "do good.""
65. Tesvich v. 3-A's Towing Co., 547 So. 2d 1106, 1114 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (Williams, J.,
dissenting in part), writ denied, 552 So. 2d 383, 384 (1989).
66. Hamilton v. Kelley, 641 So. 2d 981, 987-88 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (Hightower, J., dissenting),
writ denied, 646 So. 2d 388 (1994).
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VI. REJOINDERS
In only a few rare instances the disagreement between the majority and a
dissenting judge extends to rejoinders and a contest of who has the last word, as
in Clomon v. Monroe City School Board."' The majority opinion provoked two
justices to separately dissent, one briefly and the other at length. The longer
dissent described the majority decision as "dubious," "disturbing," and "at odds
with [a recent decision of the same court] .... I sincerely believe [it] opens the
floodgates of litigation.""8
The author of the majority opinion then rejoined with "additional reasons in
support of the majority opinion," characterizing that dissenter's analysis of the
law as "exceedingly narrow," "anomalous," "topsy-turvy," and contrary to the
views of "torts scholars." 9 Responding to the dissenter's fear of opening
"floodgates," the majority author wrote, "In the daylight of objective analysis,
the dissent's parade of hypothetically horrible cases turns out to be just a
bogeyman of its writer's imagination.""0
The dissenter then assigned "additional reasons in dissent ... [to] supple-
ment the dissent ... previously filed"'" and to respond to the majority author's
rejoinder:
[T]here is support from some legal theorists for the position taken by
the majority. There is also support against that position.
Aside from the legal theorists, a member of this court, other than this
writer, dissents from the majority view .... A member of the
appellate panel that decided the case also dissented from the majority
result .... I believe these views have merit although they do not
comport with the theory of the majority in this case, or with various
other commentators and courts."
The dissenter thereafter simply concluded by criticizing the opinion as "bad
judicial policy."'"
Although such rejoinders are rare, the above example is not unique. One
appellate court also produced a similar "continuing dialogue" between the
dissenter and the majority author."
67. 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990).
68. Id. at 580-82 (Cole, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 583, 585-86 (Dennis, J., assigning additional reasons).
70. Id. at 586.
71. ld at 587 (Cole, J., assigning additional reasons).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 588.
74. See Myers v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 483 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1985)
(Edwards, J., writing for the majority; Lanier, J., dissenting), revd, 493 So. 2d 1170 (1986).
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VII. HUMOROUS DISSENTS
Humor is sometimes effectively used by a dissenter to demonstrate what is
perceived as an absurd majority result. One appellate judge criticized the
majority's reliance on Professor Yiannopoulos' work to conclude that the
surviving spouse's usufruct, though created by will, was a legal rather than a
testamentary usufruct. The dissenter was not as impressed by the Professor. He
wrote:
A usufruct is either legal or testamentary. It is a legal usufruct when
it comes into being by operation of law,.. . period. If a usufruct does
not come into effect by operation of law, then it is a conventional or
testamentary usufruct. There is no other way. You can call it a flop-
eared dog if you wish, but you are still dealing with a testamentary
usufruct.
As for the majority's relying on Professor Yiannopoulos' observation
that it is "preferable" that the usufruct terminate at remarriage, I would
simply note here that some folks like their eggs scrambled; others hate
broccoli."
In the early 1980s, to facilitate appellate judges' resolution of criminal
appeals in the approaching constitutional change of appellate jurisdiction, the
supreme court appointed three judges from each appellate circuit to serve as
associate justices ad hoc, to sit together with four justices in criminal appeals
then pending in the supreme court. Obviously aware that the makeup of such a
"supreme court" was met with criticism, the court, on its own motion, addressed
the legality of the court's composition in State v. Petterway.7" To the major-
ity's perhaps predictable opinion, one of the appellate judges, as an ad hoc
justice, wrote a lengthy and reasoned dissent, melodically emphasizing his point:
"[T]he justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court do not have the power to assign
a judge to that Court to clerk their cases, cook their collards, cut their crabgrass,
or clean their commodes."
7
VIII. CONCLUSION
To some of my closer colleagues on the Second Circuit with whose opinions
I have occasionally differed, I have shown a cartoon, the point of which I have
expressed verbally to them. This cartoon, my favorite of all dissents that was
given to-me in 1975 when I became a judge, is hereafter reproduced. Until now
I have avoided the urge to see it republished:
75. Darby v. Rozas, 580 So. 2d 984, 989 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (Foret, J., dissenting), writ granted,
dismissed by joint motion, 585 So. 2d 554 (1991).
76. 403 So. 2d 1157 (La. 1981).
77. Id. at 1163 (Redmann, J., dissenting).
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"My dinentin opinion will be brief:
'You're i1lull 1 of tap!""
My review of the Civil Code dissents in Louisiana's published opinions,
1982-1997, supports two conclusions: Civility remains alive and well in the
appellate judiciary. The occasional review of the tenor of dissents in Louisiana
may nurture continued civility among civilians without fueling further debate
about the worth of dissenting opinions.
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